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patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical
care will be obtained when the attending physician remains on a
case from onset to cure. '49 The reasoning employed by the
Nykorchuck majority, however, seemingly requires Diane
Nykorchuck to distrust and question her doctor and to make separate appointments with him for the sole purpose of examining her
breasts, instead of requesting the breast examinations while visiting him for the treatment of endometriosis, to establish continuous
treatment as to her breast condition.5 0 Thus, negligence committed
by a physician in the form of an omission to act or failure to undertake a proper course of medical treatment may now be shielded
from a plaintiff's invocation of the continuous treatment doctrine
even if the physician is aware of the medical problem, assures the
patient that the condition will be monitored, yet fails to take further steps to ensure that the patient receives proper care for that
condition.
Richard J. Hoffman

Supreme Court, New York County declares state medical funding
program which funds childbirth, but not medically necessary
abortions, unconstitutional
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade1
See McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 408, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 1112, 452 N.Y.S.2d
351, 355 (1982) (citing Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319, (1962)).
50 Cf. CPLR 214-a commentary at 29-30 (McKinney Supp. 1992). In his commentary to
CPLR 214-a, Professor Vincent C. Alexander notes that Jorge v. New York City of Health &
Hosps. Corp., 164 A.D.2d 650, 563 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1st Dep't 1991), an Appellate Division,
First Department case addressing the issue of continuous treatment seven months before
Nykorchuck, is now questionable authority after the Court of Appeal's decision. Id. at 29. In
an attempt to distinguish Jorge from Nykorchuck, however, Professor Alexander asserts,
There may be a closer medical relationship between prenatal counseling and genetic testing [Jorge] than between endometriosis and breast cancer [Nykorchuck],
so that "treatment" for one is essentially treatment for the other. Another distinguishing fact is that the Jorge plaintiff, unlike the Nykorchuck plaintiff, continued to express concern to her doctor about the condition that gave rise to the
original act of malpractice, i.e., her genetic make-up and that of the child's father.
If she indicated lack of confidence in the accuracy of the original test results, arguably she was continuing to seek corrective treatment.
Id. at 30.
1

410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, a pregnant woman brought a class action chal-
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held that the "right of privacy.., is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" 2 and
that women therefore have the right to an abortion "free of interference by the State"'3 during the first trimester. Subsequent to
Roe v. Wade, medical funding programs allocating funds to needy
women for childbirth, but excluding assistance for abortions, were
challenged under the theory that the government was interfering
with a woman's fundamental right to an abortion.4 The Supreme
Court in Maher v. Roe5 and Harris v. McRae6 concluded that it is
not unconstitutional for states to fund childbirth while refusing to
fund abortions because "[t]here is a basic difference between direct
state interference with a protected activity and state encourage7
ment of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy."
lenging the constitutionality of a Texas statute that criminalized all abortions except those
required to save the life of the mother. Id. at 117-18.
2 Id. at 153. The Court stated that although the "Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.. .[,] the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Id. at 152
(citing, inter alia, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)). The Court concluded that this right encompassed the abortion issue because
[t]he detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically
diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child,
and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases ... the additional difficulties
and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in
consultation.
Id. at 153.
1 Id. at 163 (emphasis added). The Court held that the State cannot regulate abortions
during the first trimester of pregnancy. Id. at 164. During the second trimester, the State
cannot proscribe abortion but can "regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health." Id. During the third trimester, a state may proscribe abortion to promote the state's legitimate interest in the potentiality of human life, except where
an abortion is needed to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 164-65.
' See infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
5 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
a 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
" Maher, 432 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added); accord McRae, 448 U.S. at 315, 326; Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 368-69 (1980).
In Maher, the plaintiffs were two indigent women who challenged a Connecticut Welfare Department regulation that limited Medicaid benefits for abortion to first trimester
abortions that were medically necessary. Maher, 432 U.S. at 466-67. The Court stated that
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In response to these cases, several state courts, deeming federal
protections of the right to choose an abortion insufficient, have interpreted their own constitutions more expansively than the Federal Constitution; thus, to fund childbirth while refusing to fund
medically necessary abortions may be prohibited under a state
constitution.8 Recently, in Hope v. Perales9 the New York County
Supreme Court held that New York's Prenatal Care Assistance
the right to an abortion "protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her
freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds." Id. at 473-74. The Court added that
the Connecticut regulation "places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant
woman's path to [a nontherapeutic] abortion." Id. at 474. As a result, the Court concluded
"that the Connecticut regulation does not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized
in Roe. Id.
In McRae, title XIX of the Social Security Act ("Medicaid Act") provided federal financial aid to states that reimbursed certain medical costs for needy persons. McRae, 448
U.S. at 300-01. The 1980 "Hyde Amendment" to title XIX prohibited the use of federal
funds for abortions "except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus
were carried to term." Id. at 302 (quoting Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979))
(emphasis added). Therefore, funds were denied for abortions in situations where the
mother's health, as opposed to her life, was in danger. Id. at 302-03. The McRae Court
stated that "[tihe Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in
Maher, places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate
her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical
services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest." Id. at 315. The
Court concluded that "[a]lthough the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords
protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be
necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom." Id. at 317-18.
In Zbaraz, the plaintiffs argued that an Illinois statute, which funded abortions only if
deemed necessary to save the life of the mother, was unconstitutional. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. at
360-61. This case was decided on the same day as McRae, and the Court held that McRae
had foreclosed the issues relating to state funding of abortions. Id. at 369.
1 See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 799 (Cal. 1981)
(holding Budget Act, which restricted circumstances in which State would fund nontherapeutic abortions for eligible recipients, "invalid under the California Constitution"); Doe v.
Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 157 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that prohibition of funding for
"medically necessary abortions under the medicaid program except if the life of the woman
is endangered" violates Connecticut Constitution's Due Process Clause) (emphasis added);
Doe v. Director of Dep't of Social Servs., 468 N.W.2d 862, 880 (Mich. Ct. App.)
("[E]xclusion from the Medicaid program of indigent pregnant woman who elect 'medically
necessary' abortions in lieu of carrying the pregnancy to term is a denial of equal protection
of the law guaranteed by [the state constitution]."), appeal granted,472 N.W.2d 638 (Mich.
1991); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 937 (N.J. 1982) ("[E]xcluding medically
necessary abortions from a system providing all other medically necessary care for the indigent .... violates the New Jersey Constitution.").
9 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991).
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Program ("PCAP") 10 violates the New York State Constitution in
that it excludes all abortions, even those deemed medically necessary, from its coverage.1"
PCAP is a medical assistance program that provides prenatal
and postpartum services to women with incomes between 100%
and 185% of the federal poverty line. 2 However, PCAP will not
fund abortions, even if an abortion is necessary to preserve the life
or health of the pregnant woman. 13
The plaintiffs in Perales brought an action against the New
York State Departments of Health and Social Services, 4 contending that PCAP is unconstitutional because it "'burdens the exercise of the right of reproductive choice' and improperly pressures
. . . women toward childbirth.' 1 5 The defendants responded that
the New York Constitution does not require the program to be all
§§ 2520-2522, 2529 (McKinney Supp. 1992).
Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980-82.
12 Id. at 974-75.
"1 Id. at 976. It should be noted that under its basic Medicaid program, N.Y. State
provides funding for abortions to women at or below 100% of the federal poverty line. Id. at
977.
PCAP specifically enumerates the services that will be funded under the program, and
abortions are not included. N.Y. PUB.HEALTH LAW § 2522 (McKinney Supp. 1992). Section
2522(1) states the following:
Comprehensive prenatal care services available under the prenatal care assistance
program include: (a) prenatal risk assessment; (b) prenatal care visits; (c) laboratory services; (d)
health education for both parents regarding prenatal nutrition and other aspects
of prenatal care, alcohol and tobacco use, substance abuse, use of medication, labor and delivery, family planning to prevent future unintended pregnancies,
breast feeding, infant care and parenting; (e) referral for pediatric care; (f) referral
for nutrition services including screening, education, counseling, follow-up and
provision of services under the women, infants and children's program and the
supplemental nutrition assistance program; (g) mental health and related social
services including screening and counseling; (h) transportation services for prenatal care services; (i)
labor and delivery services; (j) post-partum services including
family planning services; (k) inpatient care, specialty physician and clinic services
which are necessary to assure a healthy delivery and recovery; (1) dental services;
(m)emergency room services; (n) home care; and (o)pharmaceuticals.
Id.
" Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 974. Two of the plaintiffs, Jane Hope and Jane Moe, had
incomes between 100% and 185% of the federal poverty line and were in need of therapeutic abortions. Id. at 973-74. The remaining plaintiffs comprised four physicians in practice
as obstetricians and gynecologists, one nurse-midwife affiliated with a New York City hospital, seven health care clinics serving women in this income bracket, four advocacy organizations whose memberships include women in this income category, and two members of the
clergy who offer guidance to women in the stated income category. Id.
10N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
"

'5 Id. at 974.
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encompassing and that women are not deprived of their right to
obtain an abortion simply because the state is not supplying the
funds.1"
Judge Ciparick concluded that PCAP violates the Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution because eligible
women requiring financial assistance for childbirth are accommodated while those in need of funds for a medically necessary abortion are denied them. 17 The court also concluded that PCAP was,
in effect, an "affirmative act by the State blocking a woman without means from obtaining an abortion,"' 8 and therefore held that
"[a]s PCAP presently stands it violates the due process rights of
an eligible pregnant woman for whom'an abortion is medically necessary by leaving her with no real choice in the decision of whether
to 'bear or beget a child.' "'s Finally, the court held that PCAP
violates the New York State Constitution, Article XVII, Section 1,
which pledges aid, care, and support to the needy, and Article
XVII, Section 3, which pledges protection and promotion of the
health of state residents.2 0
It is submitted that the court correctly concluded that PCAP
is invalid on equal protection grounds. Specifically, PCAP contravenes the New York Constitution's Equal Protection Clause because, at least with respect to medically prescribed abortions, no
compelling justification exists for directing funds to encourage
childbirth over abortion.2 ' Although the United States Supreme
Court allows states to provide financial assistance for childbirth
" Id. at 975.
'" Id. at 981-82. The New York Equal Protection Clause states that "[nmo person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 11. The court determined that PCAP is underinclusive because it "exempts
eligible women for whom an abortion is medically prescribed from receiving state assistance
on the ground that PCAP is intended to promote healthier babies and reduce the incidence
of infant mortality." Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
IS

Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979.

Id. at 980 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
Id. at 980-81. Article XVII, § 1 "imposes an affirmative duty on the State to aid the
needy." Id. at 980. The Legislature may determine whom to classify as needy and the
amount of aid to distribute. Id. (citing Matter of Bernstein v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 437, 373
N.E.2d 238, 402 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1977)). However, once it has categorized a group as needy, it
may not deny aid to this group based on criteria that is unrelated to need. Id. at 980-81
(citing Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977)). PCAP violates this principle because although all women for whom PCAP might be available are in
equal need of medical care, only those women who choose childbirth actually receive financial assistance. Id. at 979, 981.
'9

20

" See id. at 981-82.
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while refusing to pay for abortions,2 2 it is suggested that the New
York Court of Appeals, given its expansive reading of the New
York Constitution, 23 would hold that this course of conduct impermissibly burdens a woman's fundamental interest in making reproductive decisions free from state interference.
Equal protection is denied when a state, acting without sufficient cause, grants benefits or imposes burdens unequally upon
persons similarly situated.2 4 In two cases which were not discussed
22
23

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986),

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). The Court of Appeals stated that "[iun the past we have
frequently applied the State Constitution, in both civil and criminal matters, to define a
broader scope of protection than that accorded by the Federal Constitution in cases concerning individual rights and liberties." Id. at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912
(citations omitted); see also People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053,
568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (1991) (state courts are "bound to apply their own Constitutions
notwithstanding the holdings of the United States Supreme Court"); People v. Isaacson, 44
N.Y.2d 511, 519, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (1978) ("[U]nder our own State
due process clause (N.Y. State Const. art. I, § 6), this court may impose higher standards
than those held to be necessary by the ,Supreme Court under the corresponding Federal
constitutional provision."). See generally Vito J. Titone, State Constitutional Interpretation: The Search for an Anchor in a Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 431, 437, 459-60, 466
(1987) (New York Constitution affords greater protection than Federal Constitution).
" See Abrams v. Bronstein, 33 N.Y.2d 488, 492, 310 N.E.2d 528, 530, 354 N.Y.S.2d 926,
929-30 (1974). "Of course, not every difference in treatment violates the equal protection
guarantee." Id. at 492, 310 N.E.2d at 530, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
When addressing an equal protection argument, the court must decide what standard of
review should be applied. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 59, 340 N.E.2d 444, 455,
378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 16 (1975). If the "statute affects a 'fundamental interest' or employs a 'suspect' classification, the strict scrutiny test" applies, Alevy v. Downstate Medical Ctr., 39
N.Y.2d 326, 332, 348 N.E.2d 537, 543, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (1976), and the discrimination
can only be sustained if it is necessary for "the advancement of a compelling state interest
and additionally only if it can then be shown there are no less restrictive means by which
the advancement of such an interest could be achieved." Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d at 59, 340
N.E.2d at 455, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 16. If neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification
is involved, the challenged discrimination is valid if it "bears a reasonable relationship to
some legitimate legislative objective." Alevy, 39 N.Y.2d at 332, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 86.
A woman's right to obtain an abortion is considered fundamental, and strict scrutiny
should therefore be applied if the State restricts this right. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-55 (1973). The Perales court applied the strict scrutiny test, stating that the State
failed to demonstrate a "compelling justification for that medical assistance program which
in practice endangers the health and lives of eligible women for whom an abortion is medically necessary." Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 982. However, in McRae, the Supreme Court "did
not measure the restrictions at issue against a compelling interest test." Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 796 (Cal. 1981). "Rather, the Supreme Court
assumed that a discriminatory withholding of government benefits, because it imposes no
new obstacle to abortion, required only minimal justification." Id.
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by the Perales court, East Meadow Ass'n v. Board of Education"
and Phillips v. Maurer,2" the New York Court of Appeals held that
in constitutionally protected areas such as freedom of speech and
the right to vote, states must remain neutral in the absence of a
compelling reason to discriminate.27 In East Meadow Ass'n, for instance, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant violated the
state constitution by allowing public gatherings in school buildings
but denying use to the plaintiff because he was a "highly controversial figure" who sang songs "critical of American policy in Viet
Nam.''28 The court determined that this was "an unlawful restriction of the constitutional right of free speech and expression "29
under the Equal Protection Clause of the New York Constitution
because the government was granting and denying benefits in a
discriminatory manner."0
As was the case in Perales, the State in East Meadow Ass'n
did not create an absolute bar to the plaintiff's exercise of his constitutional rights, because he remained free to speak in nongovernmental facilities. Nonetheless, the court deemed the State's selective distribution of benefits to be a governmental interference with
the plaintiff's right of expression. Similarly, in Phillips,the Court
of Appeals struck down the Board of Education's use of school district funds to place a newspaper advertisement urging voters to approve the Board's budget and bond proposal.3 2 The court stated
that while the State is permitted to spend money to educate voters
on the issues and to encourage them to go to the polls, it is unconstitutional to spend state funds to encourage voting in a particular
way. 3 Thus, in the constitutionally protected areas of free speech
" 18 N.Y.2d 129, 219 N.E.2d 172, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966).
67 N.Y.2d 672, 490 N.E.2d 542, 499 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1986).
27 See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
28 East Meadow Ass'n, 18 N.Y.2d at 132, 219 N.E.2d at 173-74, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 343-44.
21 Id.
at 134, 219 N.E.2d at 175, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
20 Id.
The court stated that
28

[tihe State is not under a duty to make school buildings available for public gatherings but, if it elects to do so, it is required, by constitutional provision (U.S.
Const., 14th Amdt.; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 11), to grant the use of such facilities "in
a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner, equally applicable to all and administered with equality to all."
Id. at 133, 219 N.E.2d at 174, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 344, (quoting Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131, 143 (1966)).
3, Id. at 134, 219 N.E.2d at 175, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
32 Phillips, 67 N.Y.2d at 674, 490 N.E.2d at 543, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
"' Id. The court declared that "[t]o educate, to inform, to advocate or to promote voting on any issue may be undertaken, provided it is not to persuade nor to convey favoritism,
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and the right to vote, the State must demonstrate a compelling
reason, such as public safety and welfare,34 to justify any discriminatory actions.3 5
When New York established PCAP, it entered the constitutionally protected area of the right to an abortion. A number of
state courts have held that a state choosing to fund in this area
must "act impartially,"3 and not confer benefits on a "selective
basis. ' 37 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals should heed
East Meadow Ass'n and Phillips and adopt the view of other state
courts by holding that, in the absence of a compelling reason, it is
partisanship, partiality, approval or disapproval by a State agency of any issue, worthy as it
may be." Id. (quoting Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 293 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1975)).
" See East Meadow Ass'n, 18 N.Y.2d at 134, 219 N.E.2d at 175, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
The court stated that the State could not forbid the plaintiff from using the school building
for his performance "unless it is demonstrable on a record that such expression will immediately and irreparably create injury to the public weal." Id. (citations omitted).
31 See Hempstead Democratic Club v. Village of Hempstead,
112 A.D.2d 428, 492
N.Y.S.2d 89 (2d Dep't 1985). In Hempstead Democratic Club, the defendant, Village of
Hempstead, prohibited the plaintiff from using an auditorium in a park owned and operated
by the village. Id. at 429, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 90. The court held that the prohibition was improper partly because the auditorium had been available to all types of groups and organizations. Id. at 430, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 91. The court stated that "[a]ll persons and groups have a
'constitutional right of access [to such public forums] and the State must demonstrate compelling reasons for restricting access.' "Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
11 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 935 n.5 (N.J. 1982). The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that
[t]he right to choose whether to have an abortion ... is a fundamental right of all
pregnant women, including those entitled to Medicaid reimbursement for necessary medical treatment. As to that group of women, the challenged statute discriminates between those for whom medical care is necessary for childbirth and
those for whom an abortion is medically necessary. Under N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6.1,
those needing abortions receive funds only when their lives are at stake. By granting funds when life is at risk, but withholding them when health is endangered,
the statute denies equal protection to those women entitled to necessary medical
services under Medicaid.
Id. at 934.
In Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986), the Connecticut Superior Court
noted that "[tihe Connecticut equal protection clauses require the state when extending
benefits to keep them 'free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede [the] open and
equal' exercise of fundamental rights." Id. at 158 (citations omitted). The court added that
the regulation at issue "[cilearly . . .discriminate[d] by funding all medically necessary
procedures and services except therapeutic abortions." Id. at 159; see also Moe v. Secretary
•of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 401 (Mass. 1981) ("While the State retains wide-latitude
to decide the manner in which it will allocate benefits, it may not use criteria which discriminatorily burden the exercise of a fundamental right.").
" Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights 'v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 786 (Cal. 1981).
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unconstitutional for the State to encourage childbirth over abortions by paying only for the former. Because the State's interest in
protecting potential life cannot outweigh its interest in protecting
the life and health of the mother, no compelling reason for promoting childbirth exists when a woman's life or health is endangered
by her pregnancy. s The New York Court of Appeals should thus
uphold the state supreme court's decision and prevent the State
from discriminating against underprivileged women who require an
abortion to protect their lives or health.
Christopher Vincent Albanese
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES

CPLR 3101(d)(2): Appellate Division, Third Department holds
that surveillance videotapes may not be discovered unless party
seeking discovery has a "substantial need" and cannot obtain
"substantialequivalent" without "undue hardship"
New York's liberal standard of discovery, embodied in CPLR
3101(a), seeks to ensure full disclosure prior to trial of all information that is "material and necessary." 1 This rule promotes the
38 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64. A state may proscribe abortion in the third
trimester to further its interest in protecting fetal life "except when [an abortion] is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. In Roe v.Wade, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the state interest in protecting potential life can never outweigh the superior state interest of protecting the life and health of the mother. See id.
The New York State Legislature contends that PCAP is constitutional because the
State has a compelling objective in promoting potential life and PCAP is set up only to
achieve that objective. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975. This rationale, however, treats the
pregnant woman as a mere incubator whose sole purpose is to produce a healthy baby even
if the results are fatal to the woman. Thus, the Legislature is ignoring the State's obligation
to promote the health of the pregnant woman. See id. at 981. As the Perales court stated,
"there can be no compelling justification for that medical assistance program which in practice endangers the health and lives of eligible women for whom an abortion is medically
necessary, women whom the Legislature has expressly identified as needy in regard to medical care." Id. at 982.

' See CPLR 3101(a) (McKinney 1991). "There shall be full disclosure of all evidence
material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden
of proof ....
" Id. In order to promote full disclosure, courts read the phrase "material and
necessary" liberally to include "any facts bearing on th6 controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity." See Allen v.
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 235 N.E.2d 430, 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449,

